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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether a letter agreement which purports to create an option to purchase 
subdivision lots to be developed on unimproved real property is enforceable where 
(1) the written language of the agreement lacks the total number and size of the 
lots or a formula for determining such; 
(2) the written language of the agreement lacks an outside date for exercise of the 
option-which exercise is conditioned upon completion of subdivision development by the 
optionee; 
(3) a reasonable time has passed without completion of subdivision development; 
and 
(4) any unilateral offer or bilateral contract to sell lots created by the agreement 
was withdrawn or rescinded. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This matter is on appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Roger Russell ("Russell"), Roger Richards, and Kristen Russell. On appeal, this Court 
applies the same standard for summary judgment as applied by the district court and may 
review the entire record to determine the correctness of the district court's conclusions of 
law including conclusions that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 
Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992). 
In addition, the court may affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on any 
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ground available to the district court, even if it was not relied on below. Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3. 
Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for 
the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized in writing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Coulter & Smith, Ltd. ("Coulter") commenced this action for specific enforcement 
and for damages based upon a letter agreement (the "Letter Agreement") which allegedly 
created an option for the sale of subdivision lots which were to be developed on unimproved 
real property owned by Russell. R. 1-52, Complaint. Russell moved for dismissal or, in the 
alternative, summary judgment based on the undisputed facts which showed that any option 
rights created by the Letter Agreement were void and unenforceable as a matter of law. R. 
121-22, Motion for Summary Judgment. Russell's motion was granted by the district court 
after hearing. R. 469-77, Transcript. The district court issued findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and entered judgment dismissing Coulter's claims with prejudice. R. 453-
57, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; R. 461-63, Amended Summary Judgment. 
Coulter subsequently commenced this appeal. R. 464-65, Notice of Appeal. Russell moved 
for summary disposition, which motion was deferred until further consideration. This matter 
was subsequently poured over to this Court for disposition. 
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. In 1991, Russell and Coulter each owned or controlled undeveloped land 
located in an unincorporated portion of Salt Lake County (the "Russell Property" and the 
"Coulter Property"). R. 69-70, Affidavit of Roger Russell U 3; R. 218, Affidavit of Nathan 
Coulter H 6. The Russell Property consists of approximately 3.67 acres and is located several 
hundred yards north of the Coulter Property. See R. 264, Map. The land between the 
Russell Property and the Coulter Property consists of essentially four parcels owned by four 
unrelated parties (the "Intervening Properties"). Id.; R. 219, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter MI 
12, 13. The properties are situated such that it is possible to develop all of them together 
as one subdivision. See R. 264, Map. 
2. Russell intended to personally develop and subdivide the Russell Property and 
had hired engineers to design a layout for subdivision development. R. 218, Affidavit of 
Nathan Coulter U 7. Coulter was in the business of real estate development and also had 
plans to develop its property. R. 342, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 5. Upon 
learning of their similar development interests, the parties engaged in discussions and 
negotiations concerning joint development of their properties and/or sale of the Russell 
Property to Coulter. Id. 
3. As a result of their negotiations, Coulter prepared the Letter Agreement to 
be signed by Russell which memorialized Russell's offer to sell subdivision lots to be 
developed in the future by Coulter on the Russell Property. R. 70, Affidavit of Roger 
Russell W 4, 5. Russell signed the Letter Agreement on April 27, 1991. Id. Russell 
understood that along with development of the Russell Property, Coulter intended to acquire 
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the Intervening Properties and develop all properties together as a large, single subdivision. 
R. 218-19, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter UK 7-8,12. Coulter paid no money for Russell's offer 
to sell. R. 69-70, Affidavit of Roger Russell 1f 3. 
4. The description of the property offered for sale in the Letter Agreement 
provides: "your lots west of 1700 East at 10800 South." R. 10, Letter Agreement. When 
the Letter Agreement was signed, there were no developed "lots." At present, no subdivision 
plat has been prepared, and no legislative approval has been obtained for commencement 
of subdivision development. See R. 228, Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment. The Russell Property remains an undeveloped 3.67-acre parcel. See R. 61, 
Affidavit of George Shaw WI 6-8; see R. 2, Complaint 11 4; R. 71, Affidavit of Roger Russell 
II 12; 
5. When the Letter Agreement was signed, the parties were uncertain as to how 
many lots would or could eventually be developed on the Russell Property. The parties 
believed and expected that Sandy City would zone the property for 15,000 or 10,000 square-
foot lots which would allow for development of eight or ten lots. R. 217-18, Affidavit of 
Nathan Coulter 11 5; R. 344, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan Coulter U 10. 
6. Under the Letter Agreement, the price to be paid by Coulter for the 
completed lots was $26,500 per lot with the price to increase $100 per lot per month for 
each month a lot remained unpurchased after development of the subdivision. The relevant 
language from the Letter Agreement provides: 
Price: $26,500 per lot during the 1st month following 
completion of the lots; price of each lot to increase $100 per 
lot each month thereafter until each lot is closed. 
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Upon completion of the subdivision development we offer to 
pay you $1,500 per lot; the balance of the purchase price 
($25,000 at the outset) to be paid upon closing of each lot. 
R. 10, Letter Agreement. 
7. No outside date was provided in the Letter Agreement for Coulter to complete 
subdivision development and, thus, trigger its right to purchase the completed lots. R. 10, 
Letter Agreement. However, the parties understood that Coulter would forthwith begin 
development and that the lots would be completed and purchased beginning in Spring 1992. 
R. 219, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 1f 12; R. 346, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 
11 14. 
8. Coulter never submitted any formal application with Sandy City to annex the 
Russell Property which was a necessary prerequisite to subdivision development. R. 61, 
Affidavit of George Shaw 11 7. 
9. Coulter failed to perform any physical work on the Russell Property in 
furtherance of subdivision development. R. 71, Affidavit of Roger Russell II 12; see R. 228, 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, 
10. Coulter failed to acquire any of the four Intervening Properties by Spring 1992 
as was necessary to begin meaningful work on its large, single subdivision plan. R. 219, 
Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 13. 
11. Even though the parties intended for Coulter to have completed subdivision 
development and tendered payment for the lots by Spring 1992, Russell cooperated with 
Coulter and acquiesced to approximately six months of additional time for performance 
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based on weekly or biweekly updates provided by Coulter after such original time had 
lapsed. R. 219, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter MI 12-13. 
12. In November 1992, approximately six months after Coulter was to have 
completed development of the Russell Property, the LDS Church offered to purchase the 
Russell Property. Russell informed Coulter of his intention to accept because Coulter had 
neither completed subdivision development nor purchased the lots by Spring 1992 as 
promised. R. 3, Complaint 1 12; R. 70, Affidavit of Roger RusseU 11 9; R. 219-20, Affidavit 
of Nathan Coulter 11 14. 
13. Problems and disputes arising out of Russell's intended sale to the LDS 
Church led to negotiations between the parties and the LDS Church whereby all agreed that 
Russell and Coulter would exchange properties and the LDS Church would then buy a 
portion of the Coulter Property from Russell as the owner. R. 3, Complaint 1f 13; R. 70, 
Affidavit of Roger Russell 11 10; R. 220, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 15. Russell was to 
receive a total of $230,000 through the exchange agreement. R. 21, Real Property Exchange 
Agreement. The exchange agreement fell through. However, because the LDS Church was 
still interested in buying property in the area, Coulter later sold a portion of the Coulter 
Property to the LDS Church. R. 220, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 16. 
14. Another year-and-a-half passed and, in May 1994, a competing developer 
offered to buy the Russell Property. R. 71, Affidavit of Roger Russell 11 11. In furtherance 
of the offer, the developer took the first step toward development and submitted an 
annexation petition to Sandy City. R. 220, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter H 18; R. 61, Affidavit 
of George Shaw 1111 7-8. On September 13, 1994, Sandy City annexed the Russell Property 
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and zoned it for minimum 20,000 square-foot residential lots. R. 61, 67-68, Affidavit of 
George Shaw If 8 and Exhibit "D" thereto. 
15. On September 14,1994, three-and-a-half years after the Letter Agreement was 
signed and one day after the Russell Property was annexed and zoned by Sandy City, 
Coulter commenced this action for specific performance of the Letter Agreement. R. 1-52, 
Complaint. 
16. As part of its lawsuit, Coulter alleges that it provided substantial, valuable, and 
beneficial improvements as follows: (1) redesigning plans for a single subdivision which 
include the Coulter Property, the Intervening Properties, and the Russell Property; (2) 
rallying neighborhood support for rerouted access points for the planned single subdivision 
through the Russell Property; (3) conducting extensive negotiations with Sandy City to adopt 
the rerouted access plan; and (4) spending $35,000* to redesign and enlarge a master drain 
system located on the Coulter Property to accommodate future hookup to lots on the 
Russell Property. Appellant's Brief, at 17-18. 
17. Since Coulter has not developed or subdivided any of the properties which 
were to be a part of his single subdivision plan, none of the properties (including the Russell 
Property) have realized any tangible benefits from Coulter's preliminary efforts. See R. 228, 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
1
 In other places in its appellate brief, Coulter alleges $50,000 was spent for this 
improvement. See, e.g.. Appellant's Brief, at 27. The affidavits of Nathan Coulter filed in 
this case also contain conflicting figures of $50,000 and $35,000 in total amounts spent. R. 
219, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter If 11 ($50,000); R. 345, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan 
Coulter 11 12 ($35,000). Based on the fact that Coulter selected the $35,000 figure in its 
statement of facts, Appellant's Brief, at 6, Russell will also rely on this figure. 
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18. Coulter's $35,000 improvement to the master drain system is located on the 
Coulter Property, and the Russell Property does not presently have dedicated line access to 
that improvement. R. 262, Second Affidavit of Roger Russell K 6; R. 345-46, Supplemental 
Affidavit of Nathan Coulter H 13. Pursuant to written contract, Russell has paid Coulter 
$12,820 for his share of costs in redesigning and enlarging the master drain system which 
may eventually service all lots to be developed on all properties. R. 262, Second Affidavit 
of Roger Russell HIT 4-5; R. 52, Three-Way Work Exchange Agreement; R. 345-46, 
Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan Coulter MF 12-13. 
19. When Coulter commenced its action against Russell in September of 1994, it 
was also suing for specific performance of a contract to purchase one of the four Intervening 
Properties. R. 304-13, Certified Copy of Complaint and Answer in Coulter & Smith, Ltd. 
v. Kemp. 
20. Coulter has never had any written or oral agreement to purchase one of the 
four Intervening Properties. R. 320, Affidavit of Karen Hillstead Smith HH 1-4. 
21. When Coulter commenced this lawsuit, it lacked authority to transact business 
in Utah. R. 318, Certificate of Revocation. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Lack of Essential Terms in Writing. 
Utah law requires that contracts for sale of real property must clearly set forth all 
essential terms and must be in writing. Essential written terms include the description of the 
property and the price. In this case, the property subject to Coulter's purchase rights was 
described as "lots" to be developed on the Russell Property to be sold at a set price after 
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completion of the subdivision development. There were no lots in existence at the time the 
Letter Agreement was signed. The Letter Agreement did not specify the total number or 
the size of the lots to be developed and sold or written language concerning the parties' 
agreement, if any, as to how the total number and size of the lots was to be determined. 
The Statute of Frauds voids the Letter Agreement for this reason and prevents parole 
evidence from being used to prove what the parties' agreement may have been. 
Coulter has not sufficiently performed the Letter Agreement to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds to allow parol evidence to show the parties' agreement as to the total number and 
size of the lots. Coulter's alleged improvements to the Russell Property in reliance on the 
Letter Agreement are not exclusively referable to the alleged oral agreement and are not 
substantial, valuable, or beneficial as required by law to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
Moreover, the acts alleged do not meet the evidentiary purpose of part performance and 
estoppel to prove what the parties' agreement may have been. 
Even ignoring application of the Statute of Frauds, Coulter's proffered parol evidence 
concerning the parties' agreement is inconclusive and merely shows that the parties had 
failed to agree on how to determine the total number and size of the lots. Accordingly, the 
essential terms are not clear, and specific performance is appropriately denied. 
2. Lack of Outside Date for Vesting. 
The Letter Agreement provides no outside date for Coulter to complete development 
and exercise its rights to purchase "lots." The rule against perpetuities voids such remotely 
vesting interests even if all conditions for vesting are met within the perpetuities period. 
Utah courts apply this rule, even in commercial settings, to determine the validity of options 
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to purchase land. In this case, the language of the Letter Agreement does not meet the 
vesting requirements of the rule against perpetuities and, thus, is void ab initio. 
3. Lapse of Purchase Rights. 
If the Court rejects application of the rule against perpetuities, it must do what 
Coulter failed to do when it drafted the Letter Agreement and supply an outside date for 
exercise of its purported option rights. Under general contract principles, the Court must 
view the totality of the circumstances to imply a reasonable time for performance and 
exercise. In this case, such reasonable time is Spring 1992. The undisputed facts show that 
this was the agreed and/or intended time that Coulter was to have completed development 
and paid Russell. Equity will not tolerate that Russell continue to endure prejudicial delay 
where he should have been paid for his property in Spring 1992. Additionally, the facts 
indicate that Coulter will not be able to tender performance according to the original tenor 
of the parties' agreement until months or years in the future or perhaps never. The Court 
should, accordingly, determine that Coulter's rights under the Letter Agreement, if any, have 
lapsed. 
4. Withdrawal of Offer/Recission of Contract. 
Coulter paid no consideration for the Letter Agreement, and Russell is entitled to 
withdrawal any unilateral offer created therein at any time before acceptance. Coulter has 
never accepted Russell's offer by performing according to the terms of the Letter Agreement 
which required development of lots and payment. RusseU is, thus, entitled to withdraw his 
offer. Russell did so unequivocally in November 1992 when he informed Coulter of his 
intent to sell the Russell Property to the LDS Church. 
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Coulter's alleged acts in reliance on the Letter Agreement are insufficient for 
application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to prevent Russell from withdrawing his 
offer or supplying substitute consideration to support an enforceable contract. Such acts 
were not substantial, valuable, or beneficial to Russell and were merely preparatory to what 
was required for tender under the Letter Agreement. Moreover, to the extent any of 
Coulter's acts may be construed sufficient to create an enforceable obligation, Russell is 
justified to rescind based on Coulter's prejudicially-late, prospective performance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LETTER AGREEMENT IS VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND 
LACKS ESSENTIAL TERMS TO SUPPORT AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT 
Under Utah law a contract involving the sale of land is not enforceable unless all the 
essential elements and terms of such contract are clear and contained in a written document. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (Statute of Frauds); Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 
412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952) ("It is fundamental that the memorandum which is relied on to 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds must contain all the essential terms and provisions of the 
contract."); see also Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1985) ("Specific 
enforcement may be granted only if the parties' intent as to the essential terms of the 
agreement is clear.") 
Essential elements of a land sales contract include a description that provides 
reasonable certainty as to the size and location of the property and the price of such 
property. See generally. 6A Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, Powell on Real Property 
II 880[l][b], at 81-35 to 81-46 (1995) (discussing that the Statute of Frauds requires essential 
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terms of parties' contract to be set forth clearly in writing, including a description of the 
property, the terms and conditions of the contract, and the price) [hereinafter cited as 
Powell]. 
In this case, the Letter Agreement is void under the Statute of Frauds because its 
written provisions do not include essential terms of the parties' agreement to define the total 
number and size of the lots to be developed on the Russell Property subject to Coulter's 
purported option rights. In addition, even if the parol evidence proffered by Coulter of the 
parties' alleged agreement concerning the total number and size of the lots is considered 
under partial performance or estoppel doctrines, such parol evidence lacks the certainty 
required for specific performance of land sales contracts. This Court should, accordingly, 
affirm the district court's ruling that the Letter Agreement is void and unenforceable. 
A. The Letter Agreement does not Include Written Language as to the Total Number 
and Size of the Lots to be Developed on the Russell Property or a Formula to 
Determine Such. 
Referring to subdivision lots to be developed on the Russell Property by Coulter, the 
written language of the Letter Agreement provides for sale of "your lots west of 1700 East 
at 10800 South." R. 10, Letter Agreement. There were no lots when the Letter Agreement 
was signed, and the existence of such lots was necessarily contingent upon annexation of the 
Russell Property to Sandy City; adoption of a zoning ordinance covering the property; and 
the preparation, approval, and filing of a final subdivision plat. Since, at the time the Letter 
Agreement was signed, the total number and size of the lots was dependent upon these 
administrative contingencies and non-existent documents, the description of "lots" in the 
Letter Agreement is fatal to enforceability because it describes nothing. Berg v. Ting, 125 
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Wash. 2d 544, 886 P.2d 564, 568-69 (1995) (Grant of easement providing that location of 
easement would be determined with regard to finally approved and recorded subdivision plat 
held fatally defective and void under the Statute of Frauds because granting language 
referred to "nonexistent instrument as defining the servient estate.") (emphasis in original); 
see also Pitcher v. Lauritzen. 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491, 493-94 (1967) (Written contract 
held not specifically enforceable where written language provided for sale of 30 acres of 189 
acres owned by seller "as indicated by map" but no map was ever shown to the buyer.).2 
Recognizing that the total number and size of the lots described in the Letter 
Agreement cannot be defined by reference to nonexistent plat maps or other written 
documents, Coulter argues that this Court should accept parol evidence establishing an 
alleged agreement between the parties as to how the total number and size of the then non-
existent lots were to be determined. Coulter supports its position with reference to the 
2
 The Nebraska case discussed by Coulter, Bellevue College v. Greater Omaha Realty 
Co.. 217 Neb. 183, 348 N.W.2d 837 (1987), to support its argument that a "lot" may be sold 
even before it exists is distinguishable from the cases cited above and the case at hand. In 
Bellevue. the amount of land to be conveyed was fixed at "approximately two acres" so there 
was no question as to how much property was to be conveyed. In addition, even though the 
final plat had not been recorded when the parties entered into their contract, the court was 
able to examine preliminary plats to determine exactly where the property was to be located 
on the finally approved plat. 
Furthermore, it appears from an examination of certain of the 
preliminary plats that the property ordered by the trial court to 
be conveyed by Greater Omaha to Bellevue College is exactly 
the land which was designated by Greater Omaha as a specific 
lot in exhibits 15 and 16, first as Lot 40 and then as Lot 41. 
Id. at 841. In contrast, in this case, the size of the lots was, and remains, uncertain, and 
there was no preliminary plat map to ascertain the undefined lots described in the Letter 
Agreement. 
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generally accepted rule that where a property description is ambiguous, courts will entertain 
extrinsic and parol evidence to more particularly define the property. See Powell II 
880[l][d][iii], at 81-40 to 81-42 (commenting that courts will generally allow extrinsic and 
parol evidence to clarify ambiguities in property descriptions such as "Smith's Ranch," the 
"Shell Building," the "office building on the corner of Main and Broadway," etc.).3 
While parol evidence is generally admissible under the above-authority to clarify what 
property was meant to be described in an ambiguous property description, this authority 
does not establish that parol evidence may prove essential and material terms left out of the 
parties' written agreement as to how they decided to describe the property. This subtle, but 
important, distinction is illustrated in several Utah cases. For example, in Calder v. Third 
Judicial District. 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 (1954), the issue was whether a written 
contract satisfied the Statute of Frauds where the language provided that purchaser could 
3
 Only two of the five Utah cases cited by Coulter for this proposition actually support 
it. Rg,, Park West Village. Inc. v. Avise. 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986) (address of property 
along with physical boundaries at property address clarified ambiguity created by merely 
describing property by address); Jacobson v. Cox. 115 Utah 102, 202 P.2d 714 (1949) 
(description limited to "up in the old field, now under fence above Spring Branch Ditch" 
reasonably described property where evident from extrinsic evidence that the description was 
such that all parties in rural community knew what property was involved in transaction). 
The other three cases cited involve situations where partial performance provided an 
evidentiary foundation for an adequate and reasonably certain description of the property. 
See Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) (parties performance of agreement 
reasonably identified lot to be conveyed at "corner of Hillview and Ninth East"); Hackford 
v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982) (three years of possessing certain 20 acres defined by 
physical boundaries reasonably identified 20 acres to be excluded from contract describing 
property as "Neola (420 acre Hackford Farm), Uinta County, State of Utah"); Stauffer v. 
Call 589 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1979) (physical possession and the making of substantial 
improvement to two houses and connected acreage reasonably defined property subject to 
ambiguous written agreement). 
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purchase 200 acres selected from a larger tract owned by the seller. The contract was 
challenged under the Statute of Frauds because the location of the 200 acres was not 
described in the contract. Id. at 169. The court determined that even though the contract 
did not describe the exact location of the 200 acres, the contract satisfied the Statute of 
Frauds because the parties' agreement as to how that 200-acre parcel would be located was 
included in the written language of the contract-namely, that the purchaser could select it. 
Id. at 170. In contrast, where the property description can be determined only by reference 
to a collateral or future agreement which is not in the written language of the parties' 
contract, Utah courts hold such contracts to be unenforceable. Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 
2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026, 1028 (1973) (Written contract held void under Statute of Frauds 
where property was described in writing as "approx. 150 acres selling at $90.00 per acre" but 
the final legal description was contingent on further agreement of the parties.); Pitcher v. 
Lauritzen. 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491, 493-94 (1967) (Written contract held not 
specifically enforceable where written language provided for sale of 30 acres of 189 acres 
owned by seller "as indicated by map" but no map was ever shown to the buyer.); Vasels v. 
LoGuidice. 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987) (Written contract held unenforceable under the 
Statute of Frauds where written language provided for sale of one parcel for $1,000,000 
which was to be one of four parcels to be carved from 27 acres of land and written contract 
did not provide how the size and shape of that parcel was to be determined but rather 
provided that the final description was to be approved by all the parties in writing.). 
The Statute of Frauds ensures that all essential and material terms of a contract will 
be proved by reference to a writing and not by parol evidence thus eliminating the possibility 
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of perjury, fraud, and uncertainty in land sales agreements. Powell H 880[l][d][iii], at 81-39. 
The parol evidence Coulter seeks to introduce is not to clarify what lots were subject to its 
purported option rights-because no such lots existed then or now. Rather, the introduction 
of such parol evidence is admittedly sought to prove the essential and "material details 
required for the transfer of the property." Appellant's Brief at 14. This parol evidence-to 
prove what the parties' agreement was-is barred by the Statute of Frauds and the Letter 
Agreement is void for lack of an adequate description of the total number and size of the 
lots subject to Coulter's purported option rights. 
B. The Statute of Frauds is not Satisfied by Recharacterization of the Letter 
Agreement as an Option to Purchase the Russell Property as a Single Parcel 
In an apparent recognition of the problems created by seeking specific enforcement 
of right to purchase undefined lots that have never existed, Coulter argues that the Letter 
Agreement should be construed as an option for purchase of the entire Russell Property as 
a single parcel. Through such recharacterization, Coulter explains that the Statute of Frauds 
is met because there is no dispute as to the size and location of the Russell Property. 
Appellant's Brief, at 16. Coulter further explains that the reference to "lots" was merely a 
means by which the parties agreed on a total purchase price for the entire Russell Property. 
Id. Even if the Court were willing to accept this recharacterization, such spin does not avoid 
application of the Statute of Frauds-it merely shifts the reason for voidness from lack of 
essential terms concerning the description of the property to lack of essential terms 
concerning the price of the property. Birdzell 242 P.2d at 580 (amount of rent is essential 
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term); Powell 1 880[l][d][v], at 81-44 to 81-46 (discussing price as essential written term for 
land sales contract). 
The price for the lots in the Letter Agreement was fixed as $26,500.4 Assuming, 
arguendo, that the Letter Agreement was for the sale of the Russell Property as one parcel, 
the size and total number of the lots directly affect the price. If twelve lots were developed, 
the price would equal $318,000; if ten, $265,000; if eight, $212,000; and if six, $159,000. 
Because there were no lots when the Letter Agreement was signed, the total number of lots 
and, consequently, the total price for the Russell Property is impossible to determine from 
the written language of the Letter Agreement. Coulter must, therefore, rely on parol 
evidence to show what the parties' agreement may have been regarding the total number 
of lots to be developed. As previously discussed, because the terms of such alleged 
agreement are a material and essential part of the parties' agreement, parol evidence 
establishing such terms is barred by the Statute of Frauds, and the Letter Agreement is void. 
See, e.g.. Moore & Assoc. Realty v. Arrowhead at Vail 892 P.2d 367, 371 (Colo. App. 1994) 
(Letter of intent to sell specified lot held void under the Statute of Frauds where price for 
lot was based on a set price for condominium units to be developed on the lot and the 
written language of the letter of intent did not specify how may condominium units would 
be built or a formula for determining such number.). 
4
 The Letter Agreement further provided for an increase of $100.00 per lot per month 
"following completion of the lots." R. 10, Letter Agreement. 
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C Coulter's Parol Evidence of the Parties3 Alleged Agreement Should Not Be 
Considered Under the Doctrines of Partial Performance or Equitable Estoppel 
Notwithstanding the writing requirement imposed by the Statute of Frauds, Coulter 
argues that because it has partially performed the Letter Agreement, it should be permitted 
to introduce parol evidence establishing the material and essential terms concerning the total 
number and size of the lots which it left out of the Letter Agreement. However, as a matter 
of law, the acts alleged by Coulter are insufficient to show part performance or support an 
estoppel theory sufficient to overcome application of the Statute of Frauds. See Bear Island 
Water Ass'n. Inc. v. Brown. 125 Idaho 717, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994) (whether acts are 
sufficient as part performance is a matter of law). 
The doctrines of partial performance and equitable estoppel in connection with oral 
contracts involving the sale of land were fashioned by courts of equity not to "annul the 
Statute of Frauds, but only to prevent its being made the means of perpetrating a fraud." 
Coleman v.Dillman. 624 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1981) (footnote omitted); Jacobson v. Cox, 202 
P.2d 714, 721 & 723 (1949). Such doctrines are to be "applied with great care" by the 
courts, and typically require the purchaser to show (1) actual open and exclusive possession 
of the land with the seller's consent; (2) substantial, valuable, and beneficial improvements 
to the land; (3) valuable consideration given in exchange for the conveyance; and (4) that 
all the foregoing were exclusively referable to the oral contract. Coleman, 624 P.2d at 715; 
see also Powell 11 880[2][c][i], at 81-69 to 81-70 (discussing that part performance generally 
requires paying the contract price, taking possession of the property, and making 
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improvements thereon; further commenting that most courts will require at least two of the 
three conditions to be satisfied). 
Since Coulter does not have possession of the lots and paid no consideration5 for its 
purported option to purchase such lots, its partial performance and estoppel theories must 
rest solely on whether it made substantial, valuable, and beneficial improvements to the 
Russell Property which were exclusively referable to the Letter Agreement. Coulter 
specifically alleges four categories of substantial, valuable, and beneficial improvements as 
follows: (1) redesigning plans for a single subdivision which would include the Coulter 
Property, the Intervening Properties, and the Russell Property; (2) rallying neighborhood 
support for rerouted access points for the planned single subdivision through the Russell 
Property; (3) conducting extensive negotiations with Sandy City to adopt the rerouted access 
plan; and (4) spending $35,000 to redesign and enlarge a master drain system located on the 
Coulter Property to accommodate future hookup to the Russell Property when the single 
subdivision was complete. Appellant's Brief, at 17-18. 
Case law establishes that Coulter's first three categories of alleged substantial, 
valuable, and beneficial improvements are insufficient to support a claim of partial 
performance or estoppel. Redesigning plans, rallying neighborhood support, and even 
negotiations with city officials are merely preparatory and ancillary to the condition 
5
 Coulter claims that its alleged partial performance constitutes "ample consideration." 
Appellant's Brief, at 26-29. It is clear, however, that no consideration was given in exchange 
for the Letter Agreement and Coulter's "consideration" arguments are more in the nature 
of promissory estoppel. See infra. In any event, for purposes of part performance and 
estoppel theories, the acts alleged in reliance of the agreement cannot serve as both the 
"consideration" and the "part performance." 
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precedent of Coulter's right to purchase lots. Coulter was to "complete the subdivision 
development." R. 10, Letter Agreement (emphasis added). Preparatory and ancillary acts 
to fulfill this condition to purchase do not provide an adequate equitable basis for avoiding 
the Statute of Frauds. For example, in Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 291, 495 P.2d 814 
(1972), the Utah Supreme Court rejected the purchasers' argument that it had partly 
performed an oral contract because they had "at great expense to themselves" surveyed the 
land promised to be conveyed. Id. at 815. The court rejected the purchasers' arguments 
and explained as follows: 
Acts merely ancillary to an oral agreement for the sale 
of lands, although attended with expense, are not considered 
acts of part performance sufficient to relieve the case from the 
provisions of the statute of frauds. 
Id. at 817 (quoting DeMarco v. Estlow. 18 N.J. Super. 30, 86 A.2d 446, 447-48 (1952)); see 
also Williams v. Fulton. 30 Wash. App. 173, 632 P.2d 920 (1981) (Part performance not 
shown where purchaser paid $1,000 earnest money, conducted various tests and surveys on 
the property, and arranged for the property's zoning designation to be changed.). 
Additionally, it is clear from the record that none of Coulter's efforts relating to redesigning 
of plans, rallying neighborhood support, and meeting with city officials have done anything 
to provide a tangible benefit the Russell Property. Coulter has been unable to consummate 
its single subdivision plan for nearly five years, and the record strongly suggests that it may 
never accomplish what it originally set forth to do.6 Unless and until Coulter is able to 
6
 It is apparent that Coulter has several major obstacles to overcome before it can or 
will develop the Property as planned and promised. These include (1) rezoning of all 
properties included in its single subdivision plan to allow for building of 10,000 or 15,000 
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bring all of his preliminary plans, neighborhood support, and governmental approvals 
together to actually develop the Russell Property as part of a single subdivision, all such 
preliminary acts are of no value or benefit to the Russell Property. As a matter of law, this 
Court should, therefore, determine that such acts do not constitute part performance or 
support an estoppel theory. 
Coulter's fourth category of alleged substantial, valuable, and beneficial improvements 
regarding the $35,000 spent to redesign and enlarge the master drain system, although 
representing a substantial expenditure by Coulter, is also insufficient to prove part 
performance or support an estoppel theory. This improvement fails as part performance 
because it is not on the Russell Property but on the Coulter Property. Accordingly, it should 
also be considered ancillary and will not actually benefit the Russell property unless Coulter 
is able to successfully consummate its single subdivision plan and install connecting lines. 
R. 261, Second Affidavit of Roger Russell, HIT 4, 6 (establishing that improvements are 
located on the Coulter Property and that no connecting lines run between it and the Russell 
Property). More importantly, however, the alleged improvement fails as partial performance 
square-foot lots as originally contemplated, R. 67-68, Ordinance for Annexation and Zoning 
Ordinance of the Russell Property, (2) resolving a lawsuit with one Intervening Property 
owner, R. 304-13, Complaint and Answer in Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Kemp, and (3) 
purchasing a parcel from another Intervening Property owner who has, as yet, declined to 
sell. R. 319-322, Affidavit of Karen Hillstead Smith. Even if all preliminary matters were 
resolved, actual development would take substantial efforts and significant time to 
accomplish. See Sandy City Code of Ordinances, Subdivision Regulations § 15-34-1 et seq. 
(Draft Feb. 6,1996) (administrative, bonding, and construction requirements for subdivision 
development). At present, it is also questionable whether Coulter can even legally purchase 
or develop any property as its authority to transact business in Utah has been revoked. See 
R. 318, Certificate of Revocation. 
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because it is not "exclusively referable" to the oral agreement sought to be enforced. Russell 
knew of Coulter's single subdivision plan and agreed to cooperate in its development efforts. 
R. 218-19, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter MI 7-8, 12. In acknowledgment of the fact that the 
redesign and enlargement of the main drain system to be installed on the Coulter Property 
might eventually benefit the Russell Property (even if Coulter never completed its single 
subdivision as planned), Russell agreed (in a separate written agreement) to pay, and later 
paid, Coulter $12,820 for his share of the cost to enlarge the master drain. R. 261, Second 
Affidavit of Roger Russell MI 4-5. Coulter even attached the parties' written agreement 
entitled "THREE-WAY WORK EXCHANGE AGREEMENT" to its Complaint which 
expressly sets forth Coulter's contractual obligation to "enlarge a master drain system to be 
installed as per the design of Bush & Gudgell; this enlargement requested by and for the 
benefit of certain property under the control of Dr. Roger Russell." R. 52, Three-Way Work 
Exchange Agreement. Accordingly, since Coulter's expenses incurred in redesigning and 
enlarging the master drain system were not "exclusively referable" to the Letter Agreement, 
such expenditures cannot support partial performance or equitable estoppel. See Coleman 
v. Dillman. 624 P.2d 713, 715-16 (Utah 1981) (rejecting enforcement of oral agreement 
where improvements and possession were not "exclusively referable" to oral sales contract 
but equally referable to lease). 
A further problem with Coulter's part performance and estoppel arguments is that 
the alleged acts do not assist the Court in determining the essential terms of the contract 
which Coulter left out-namely, the total number and size of the lots to be developed on the 
Russell Property. As previously set forth, partial performance does not "annul the Statute 
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of Frauds, but only [prevents] its being made the means of perpetrating fraud." Coleman, 
624 P.2d at 715. Part performance only satisfies the goals of the Statute of Frauds to 
prevent fraud and provide certainty if the part performance clearly evidences the terms of 
the parties' agreement that should have been in writing but were not. Accordingly, courts 
require that part performance show evidence of the material terms left out of the parties 
agreement. For example, where the property is ambiguously described, courts will look at 
the acts of part performance to fulfill an evidentiary function to define what the parties left 
out of their agreement. See, e.g.. Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) (suit for specific 
performance upheld where extrinsic evidence of parties' actions specifically identified 
property subject to ambiguous property description); Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 
1982) (same); Stauffer v. Call. 589 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1979) (oral agreement enforced 
notwithstanding Statute of Frauds where acts of parties and natural boundaries adequately 
defined property subject to agreement). The court in Berg v. Ting, 125 Wash. 2d 544, 886 
P.2d 564 (1995), emphasized this principle in a case with similar problems as those 
encountered in this case. The parties had agreed in writing to grant an easement with 
reference to a subdivision plat that was not in existence at the time the agreement was 
signed. Id. at 568. The court held that the agreement could not be enforced under the 
Statute of Frauds because the written agreement referred to a nonexistent instrument to 
define the servient estate and did not reference an instrument which contained such a 
description. Id. at 569. The grantees of the easement argued for enforcement of the 
easement because their withdrawal of opposition to the subdivision platting served as partial 
performance of the agreement. Id. at 567, 572. Even though the parties had a written 
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agreement and had arguably partly-performed through withdrawal of their opposition, the 
court rejected the grantee's argument because the partial performance alleged "reveal[ed] 
nothing about the character or terms of any contract." Id. at 572. Similarly, in this case, 
none of the acts alleged by Coulter satisfy the evidentiary function of the equitable doctrines 
of part performance and estoppel necessary to overcome the Statute of Frauds because they 
fail to define what the parties' agreement concerning the total number and size of the lots 
to be developed on the Russell Property. For the reason that Coulter's acts are legally 
insufficient to support partial performance and estoppel theories and for this additional 
reason, Coulter's partial performance and estoppel arguments should be rejected by the 
Court. 
D. The Parol Evidence Proffered by Coulter Fails to Clearly Describe the Parties9 
Agreement 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court is willing to consider Coulter's parol evidence, 
it must determine whether such evidence provides clear and convincing evidence of the 
material and essential terms left out of the Letter Agreement. 
The evidence must show a meeting of the minds based on an 
offer and a sufficient acceptance, as well as the consideration 
necessary for a valid contract. There must also be no proof of 
mistake, misrepresentation or illegality that would otherwise 
invalidate the contract. Generally, the standard for proving the 
existence of an oral contract and its terms is demanding. Proof 
requires clear and convincing evidence. 
Powell 11 880[2][a], at 81-57 to 81-58 (emphasis added); see also Barnard v. Barnard, 700 
P.2d 1113, 1114 (1985) ("Specific enforcement may be granted only if the parties' intent as 
to the essential terms of the agreement is clear."); In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 
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P.2d 278, 280 (1954) (specifically enforceable land contract must be "definite, certain and 
fair"). 
In this case, the material and essential terms which Coulter wishes to prove by parol 
evidence is the parties' agreement as to the total number and size of the lots that were to 
be developed on the Russell Property. Because Sandy City has unfavorably zoned the 
Russell Property for 20,000 square-foot lots, only six lots may be developed. R. 61, 67-68, 
Affidavit of George Shaw If 8 and Exhibits "D" thereto. Accordingly, Coulter argues that its 
parol evidence clearly and convincingly shows that the parties agreed that the total number 
and size of the "lots" would be determined by whatever zoning was ultimately approved by 
Sandy City with Russell to exclusively bear the benefit or burden of favorable or unfavorable 
zoning. Appellant's Brief, at 4, 14, 16. 
However, contrary to Coulter's arguments, the affidavit testimony relied on 
establishes, at the very most, that the parties agreed that the total number of lots would be 
eight or ten based on their mutual understanding and expectation that Sandy City would 
zone the Russell Property for 15,000 or 10,000 square-foot lots. 
The zoning for the 3.67-Acre Parcel had not been finalized at 
the time of the Option Agreement. Russell and I believed that 
we could procure R-l-15 or R-l-10 zoning, which would allow 
8 to 10 lots to be developed. The purchase price for the 3.67-
Acre Parcel was thus contingent on the zoning that could be 
obtained. 
R. 217-18, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 5. 
Dr. Russell assured me in conversations both prior to April 27, 
1991 and thereafter that he was confident that his contacts with 
the local neighbors would be sufficient to obtain their 
agreement to the proposed R-l-15 or R-l-10 zoning. Dr. 
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Russell told me that he had friends in the nearby Cobblestone 
subdivision with whom he had already spoken, and that no one 
in that subdivision was opposed to the R-l-15 or R-l-10 zoning. 
Dr. Russell also said that he could deliver approval from the 
Bell Canyon Homeowners Association since he sat on the board 
of directors of that entity. In at least one conversation prior to 
April 27, 1991, Dr. Russell and I discussed the fact that 
depending upon the zoning Dr. Russell was able to deliver, the 
3.67-Acre Parcel would accommodate differing numbers of 
different sized lots, and thus Dr. Russell would receive more 
money for the denser zoning. 
R. 344, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 10.7 
This parol evidence not only lacks clear and convincing proof that the parties agreed 
that Russell would assume all risks of adverse zoning but also shows that there was no 
meeting of the minds as to the total number, size, and price of the lots if zoning less 
favorable than 15,000 square-foot lots was ultimately legislated by Sandy City.8 Accordingly, 
7
 Further evidence that the Letter Agreement was likely based on the parties' 
assumption that at least eight, and probably ten, lots could be developed can be found in the 
terms of the parties' unconsummated exchange agreement which was negotiated when 
Russell's attempted sale of the Russell Property to the LDS Church was thwarted. Through 
that transaction, the parties provided that Russell would receive a total of $230,000 for the 
transfer of the Russell Property. R. 21, Complaint, Exhibit 6. Dividing this number by the 
$26,500 price of lots in the Letter Agreement evidences the equivalent yield from 8.67 lots. 
8
 To the extent Coulter may argue in its reply brief that Russell is to blame for the 
unfavorable zoning, such argument should be rejected. The record establishes that the 
Coulter Property was annexed prior to the Russell Property and had already set the standard 
for 20,000 square-foot-lot zoning of the contiguous properties before the Russell Property 
was annexed and zoned. See R. 294-99, Ordinance for Annexation and Zoning of the 
Coulter & Smith Property; cf. R. 67-69, Ordinance for Annexation and Zoning of the Russell 
Property. In any event, zoning is not something that a property owner may dictate, but is 
a legislative function and an activity wholly within the discretion of the legislative bodies of 
municipalities. See Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 
1150 (Utah 1976). 
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because the parties had not agreed on how their agreement would be affected if the Russell 
Property was not zoned as understood, expected, and contemplated by the parties, the 
essential and material terms necessary to enforce the Letter Agreement are lacking, and the 
parties' alleged oral agreement cannot be specifically enforced. See generally 17A Am. Jur. 
2d, Contracts § 26, at 54-55 (1991) ("There must be mutual asset or a meeting of the minds 
on all essential elements or terms in order to form a binding contract.").9 
II. THE LETTER AGREEMENT IS VOID UNDER THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES 
The rule against perpetuities provides that "no interest is good unless it must vest, if 
at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." 
W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 639 (1938) [hereinafter 
cited as "Nutshell"]. This rule applies to all contingent interests including options and 
specifically requires that options be drafted so that there is no possibility that the option may 
be exercised outside of the perpetuities period. See Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 29 
Utah 2d 469, 511 P.2d 737 (1973); Anderson v. Anderson. 15 Utah 2d 7, 386 P.2d 406 
(1963); Fisher v. Bailev. 14 Utah 2d 424, 385 P.2d 985 (1963); Nutshell at 660-62. Failure 
to satisfy the rule against perpetuities causes the interest to be void ab initio, and the interest 
cannot be cured even if the contingency occurs within the prescribed time period. Nutshell 
at 642; 61 Am. Jur. 2d Perpetuities § 26 (1982). 
9
 The fact that the parties were mistaken that zoning could be manipulated further 
shows that the oral agreement as alleged by Coulter was based on a mutual mistake and, 
thus, not enforceable. See generally 17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 213, at 220-21 (1991). 
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By drafting the Letter Agreement to tie its option rights to "completion of the lots" 
and "completion of the subdivision development," Coulter created an interest void under the 
rule against perpetuities. R. 10, Letter Agreement. The Letter Agreement has no outside 
time period for Coulter to complete the subdivision and, thus, no outside date for exercise 
of its purported option rights on the completed lots. As explained by Professor Leach in 
describing the case of the "inexhaustible gravel pit," this contingency of possible unlimited 
duration voids the interest. 
T was in the sand and gravel business. He owned gravel pits 
which, at the time of his death, would have been exhausted in 
4 years if worked at the rate which was habitual with T. T died, 
leaving a will which devised to trustees the gravel pits in trust to 
work until the same were exhausted, then to sell the pits and 
divide the proceeds among T's issue then living. The pits were 
actually exhausted in 6 years. But the gift to issue was held bad 
on the ground that they might not have exhausted within 21 
years. 
Nutshell at 644-45. 
Coulter directs this Court to cases from California and North Carolina for support 
that courts no longer use the rule against perpetuities to void remotely vesting interests in 
commercial transactions but have abandoned it in favor of general contract rules which allow 
the court to infer a reasonable time requirement for vesting if no time is given. See Wong 
v. DiGrazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817, 35 Cal. Rptr 241 (1963); Rodin v. Merritt 48 N.C. 
App. 64; 268 S.E.2d 539 (1980). While these cases perhaps establish that the Letter 
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Agreement would be valid in California and North Carolina, they do not establish the law 
in Utah which applies in this case.10 
In, Fisher v. Bailey, 14 Utah 2d 424, 385 P.2d 985 (1963), a case similar to the case 
at hand, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that the rule against perpetuities applies in 
commercial transactions. The sellers challenged the validity of a complex contract whereby 
they agreed to improve, plat, subdivide, and sell numerous subdivision lots to a construction 
company. The sellers' based their challenge on the fact that the terms of the contract gave 
the construction company "an option to purchase part of these lots after a life or lives in 
being and 21 years and the gestation period." Id. at 986. Rather than dispose of the sellers' 
argument by explaining that contract rules would apply in this commercial transaction, the 
court painstakingly analyzed the written language of the parties agreement with reference 
to the rule against perpetuities and determined that it did not leave any contingencies of 
unlimited duration but provided for exercise of purchase rights within the perpetuities 
period. 
Although the contract does not expressly state that all of 
the lots must be transferred on or before July 1, 1964, it does 
definitely so indicate. It not only provides for the development 
and release of the 61 lots before any mention is made of the 
10
 The three Utah cases cited by Coulter to show that Utah has abandoned the rule 
against perpetuities in commercial transactions are inapposite. See Cooper v. Deseret 
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. 757 P.2d 483 (Utah 1988); Bradford v. Alvev & Sons, 621 
P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 
1987). In none of these cases was the rule against perpetuities raised by the parties or 
discussed by the court. Additionally, Cooper v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 757 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1988), did not even involve a real property "vesting" issue, but only how long 
a bank had to enforce contractual rights pursuant to a due on sale clause in a mortgage 
transaction. 
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additional 21 lots, and provides for a change in the purchase 
price in case of a change in the cost of development, but it 
provides for the improvement of 12 lots within 90 days, then 49 
lots after six months, and then provides for the holding of the 
additional 21 lots subject exclusively to the order of the buyer 
until July 1, 1964, but gave the Company no right to purchase 
those lots after that time. There was a firm agreement by the 
buyer to purchase and the seller to sell the 61 lots, only the 
time for the release of such lots which must be after January 1, 
1960, was left to the option of the Company, and the sellers 
Bailey agreed to hold the additional 21 lots until July 1, 1964, to 
the order of the Company. All this fits into a pattern that all of 
the lots were to be transferred on or before the last mentioned 
date. We conclude that under these circumstances it would be 
unreasonable to hold that the option to purchase any of these 
lots could be exercised any substantial period of time after 
January 1,1964, and therefore this contract does not violate the 
rule against perpetuities. 
Id. at 987-98;11 accord Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills. 29 Utah 2d 469, 511 P.2d 737 
11
 Justice Crockett concurred in the result of Bailey but suggested that the court should 
have analyzed the transaction based on contract principles instead of the rule against 
perpetuities. 
I concur and offer these further observations: in a 
contract of this character where something is to be done in 
connection with planned future activities, as was the conveyance 
of these lots, and specification of a definite time is omitted, the 
law will imply that it is to be done within some such reasonable 
time as it must sensibly be supposed was contemplated by the 
parties. What the reasonable time is to be determined by 
looking at all of the facts and circumstances. That is what 
should be done here. 
Fisher. 385 P.2d at 989. 
The fact that Justice Crockett supported that contract rules should supplant the rule 
against perpetuities and the majority of the court decided the case with respect to the rule 
against perpetuities shows that Utah law has not abandoned this important and long-standing 
real property doctrine. In addition, the fact that the Supreme Court of Utah has continued 
to apply the rule against perpetuities in commercial option transactions suggest Justice 
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(1973) (court analyzed option agreement in commercial setting for validity under the rule 
against perpetuities). 
In contrast to the agreement in Fisher, the Letter Agreement cannot be construed 
in any manner to provide an outside date for exercise of Coulter's purported option rights 
because it has no date for subdivision completion. Even though Coulter emphasized in its 
pleadings below that the subdivision was to be completed "forthwith" and with all "due 
diligence," this fact does not provide an outside date for subdivision completion and exercise 
of rights within the perpetuities period. See R. 227, Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment.12 Indeed, Coulter by initiating this lawsuit and pursuing this appeal 
has already taken the position that its option rights in the Letter Agreement last nearly five 
years. Moreover, since no work has been done to begin formal subdivision development of 
the Russell Property, Coulter will no-doubt require substantial additional time to exercise 
its purported rights. Russell asks this Court to recognize that Utah law has not abandoned 
the rule against perpetuities voiding remotely vesting interests in commercial transactions 
and that, therefore, the Letter Agreement is void. 
Crockett's views have yet to win the day. See, e.g.. Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 29 
Utah 2d 469, 511 P.2d 737 (1973) (court analyzed option agreement in commercial setting 
under the rule against perpetuities). 
12
 Coulter has chosen not to emphasize the language of the Letter Agreement and its 
affidavits emphasizing the urgency of subdivision development in this appeal. Russell 
assumes that this is because such arguments militate in favor of a ruling that any time for 
exercise beyond Spring 1992 was beyond a "reasonable time." See infra. 
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HI. ANY PURCHASE RIGHTS CREATED BY THE LETTER AGREEMENT HAVE 
LAPSED 
In the event the Court declines to apply the rule against perpetuities in favor of 
applying general contract principles, the Court must determine and imply a "reasonable 
time" term in the Letter Agreement for exercise of Coulter's purported option rights. See 
Cooper v. Deseret Federal Savs. & Loan. 757 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah App. 1988) ("When a 
contract fails to specify the time by which a certain act must be performed, the law implies 
the act be performed within a reasonable time.). To determine what time term the law 
should imply, the Court should evaluate the facts surrounding the transaction to ascertain 
what time term may have been contemplated by the parties or is otherwise reasonable under 
the totality of the circumstances. See generally Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240, 
1242 (Utah 1980). Coulter contends that this Court cannot determine a "reasonable time" 
term for exercise of its rights without further proceedings in the district court preceded by 
discovery and full trial preparation by the parties. Russell respectfully submits that further 
use of private and judicial resources to establish more facts is unnecessary because the 
undisputed facts already before the Court conclusively establish that Coulter's rights, if any, 
have lapsed. 
In determining the reasonable time for Coulter to have tendered performance and 
exercised its purchase rights, the Court should initially consider the circumstances presented 
by the transaction involved. In this case, the transaction involves an asserted option to 
purchase lots to be developed on the Russell Property. Because the agreement involves a 
right to purchase land at a specified price, Russell would normally be entitled to strictly 
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enforce any timing provisions. See Catmull v. Johnson, 541 P.2d 793, 706 (Utah 1975) ("[B]y 
its very nature, an option is an instrument as to which time is of the essence.") (footnote 
omitted). In addition, equities should be balanced in Russell's favor because he is the party 
who must bear the burdens and carry the expenses associated with the property including 
maintenance of financing, insurance, taxes, and tort liability while waiting for Coulter to 
tender performance. See, e.g., Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d at 1242 (vendor in land 
sales agreement conditioned on performance of purchaser entitled to equitable deference 
based on the fact that the vendor is bound while the purchaser may choose whether to 
perform); Aspinwall v. Ryan, 190 Or. 530, 226 P.2d 814, 817 (1951) (discussing equitable 
considerations in favor of vendor under option agreement including carrying property at 
vendor's expense, risk of loss, costs, insurance, and burden to patrol against trespass). The 
Court should also consider that the parties, presumably in recognition of costs to be borne 
by Russell in the event of delay, bargained for price adjustments for late payments. R. 10, 
Letter Agreement (providing that the price of the individual lots would increase $100 per 
month after completion of the lots). Within this context, the Court must determine when 
Coulter was required to have completed development and paid Russell for the lots. 
The undisputed facts show that the parties intended Coulter to have completed 
development of subdivision lots on the Russell Property-thus triggering its right to purchase 
lots and the agreed $100 per lot per month increase-by Spring 1992. Russell has testified 
in his affidavit that Coulter "promised" to finish subdivision development by Spring 1992. 
R. 70, Affidavit of Roger Russell MI 6-7. Coulter denies that it promised anything, but 
admits that the parties intended that subdivision development would be accomplished with 
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"all due diligence" and the parties "believed that such could be done by the Spring of 1992." 
R. 219, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 1f 12; see also R. 346, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan 
Coulter K 14 (same). The evidence submitted by Coulter even expresses a realization that 
its performance was past due in Spring 1992 because it is at this time that Coulter 
apparently felt obligated to consult with Russell on a "weekly or biweekly basis" regarding 
its progress. R. 219, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 1f 13. Moreover, it is further undisputed 
that Russell took no acts in contravention of Coulter's rights until November 1992, well 
beyond Spring 1992, when Russell informed Coulter of his intent to sell to the LDS Church 
because of Coulter's inability to finish subdivision development and purchase lots within the 
time promised. R. 71, Affidavit of Roger Russell 11 15. Indeed, Coulter even admits that 
Russell was cooperative and acquiesced to its delays until Russell gave notice of his intent 
to sell to the LDS Church-at which time Coulter considered Russell to be in breach of the 
Letter Agreement. R. 220, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter U 15. These facts show that Spring 
1992 is the proper time term to be implied by law for Coulter to have exercised its rights. 
These facts also show that Russell did not interfere with Coulter's performance and even 
acquiesced to an additional reasonable time when Coulter failed to show appreciable 
progress toward meeting the conditions of its performance within the time period intended 
by the parties. There is no additional need for factual development at trial to determine 
that Coulter's option rights have lapsed. 
Coulter's arguments that equitable adjustments may need to be made because its 
performance has been thwarted by contingencies beyond its control such as unfruitful 
negotiations with the Intervening Property owners and difficulties with government 
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authorities should be rejected. Appellant's Brief, at 21. Coulter, not Russell, is the party 
who agreed to forthwith "complete the subdivision development" as a condition to exercising 
purchase rights. See Appellant's Brief, at 26-29. Russell did not assume risks of unforeseen 
delay and cannot be fairly expected to hold his property indefinitely until Coulter is able to 
perform. Equity, instead, demands that Russell either be compensated fairly for losses 
caused by Coulter's delay or that he be allowed to sell his property to another willing buyer. 
It is now approaching five years since the Letter Agreement was signed and four 
years since Spring of 1992 when Russell should have been paid for the lots. Coulter failed 
to forthwith develop the Property and failed to even make appreciable progress by Spring 
1992. The Russell Property remains as it was in April 1991 when the Letter Agreement was 
signed, and Russell has realized no tangible benefit from any of Coulter's acts. Although 
Coulter has sued Russell seeking specific performance of the Letter Agreement, it is clear 
that Coulter has not timely fulfilled the conditions for exercise and tendered performance 
as is required before bringing such a suit. See also Aspinwall v. Ryan, 190 Or. 530, 226 P.2d 
814, 817 (1951) ("Before an optionee may bring suit for specific performance he must 
clearly, explicitly, and unequivocally, within the time specified, communicate to the optionor 
his acceptance of the offer contained in the option."). It is also clear that tender of such 
performance is likely to be months or years in the future because Coulter has several major 
obstacles to overcome before it can develop the Property as planned and promised.13 The 
13
 These include: (1) rezoning of all properties included in its planned single subdivision 
to allow for building of 10,000 or 15,000 square-foot lots as originally contemplated, R. 67-
68, Annexation and Zoning Ordinance for the Russell Property, (2) resolving a lawsuit with 
one Intervening Property owner, R. 304-13, Complaint and Answer in Coulter & Smith. Ltd. 
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parties' did not agree or intend that Coulter's rights under the Letter Agreement would last 
indefinitely. Rather, the whole tenor of the transaction, as supported by the documents and 
affidavits submitted by the parties, was that the Letter Agreement was for the immediate 
development, platting, and transfer of lots. Accordingly, this Court should determine that 
these undisputed facts show Coulter's rights, if any, have lapsed. 
IV. ANY OFFER OR CONTRACT TO SELL LOTS CREATED BY THE LETTER 
AGREEMENT HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN OR RESCINDED 
An option without consideration is merely a continuing offer to sell at a certain price 
that can be withdrawn at any time before acceptance. 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor & Purchaser 
§ 34 (1975). Withdrawal of an offer may be express or implied by conduct that is 
inconsistent with the offer. Restatement fSecond) of Contracts § 43. Coulter did not 
dispute below, and does not dispute on appeal, this legal principle or the fact that Russell 
unequivocally withdrew and revoked his offer to sell "lots" in November 1992 when he 
informed Coulter of his intent to sell to the LDS Church. Rather, Coulter asserts that 
Russell cannot withdraw his offer because it has given "ample consideration" in exchange for 
its rights to purchase under the Agreement. Appellant's Brief, at 26-29. 
v. Kemp, and (3) purchasing a parcel from another Intervening Property owner who has, as 
yet, declined to sell. R. 320, Affidavit of Karen Hillstead Smith. Even if all preliminary 
matters were resolved, actual development would take substantial efforts and significant time 
to accomplish. See Sandy City Code of Ordinances, Subdivision Regulations § 15-34-1 et 
seq. (Draft Feb. 6, 1996) (administrative, bonding, and construction requirements for 
subdivision development). It is also questionable whether Coulter can even legally purchase 
or develop any property as its authority to transact business in Utah was revoked at the time 
it filed its Complaint. See R. 318, Certificate of Revocation. 
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Coulter paid no money for its rights under the Letter Agreement. R. 70, Affidavit 
of Roger Russell If 8. Notwithstanding, Coulter argues that Russell received consideration 
for its option rights through its promise to complete the subdivision development. 
Appellant's Brief, at 27-28. While Russell does not dispute that Coulter promised to 
forthwith develop and subdivide the Russell Property as a necessary condition to purchasing 
future lots, this promise is likely illusory and unenforceable by Russell and, thus, cannot 
serve as consideration for Russell's grant of option rights. See Estate of Schmidt v. Downs, 
775 P.2d 427, 431 (Utah App. 1989) ("an option is a unilateral obligation binding only on 
the optionor"); Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 
P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985) ("For mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral contract to 
constitute consideration for each other, the promises must be binding."). 
Coulter next argues that since it has begun performance of the condition precedent 
to exercise of rights in the Letter Agreement-namely, to subdivide the Russell Property-in 
reliance on the Letter Agreement, that such performance is a substitute for consideration 
and estops Russell from withdrawing his offer-presumably until Coulter is able to tender 
performance through completion of subdivision development and payment. Appellant's 
Brief, at 27-28. Coulter alleges that the same facts which show partial performance of the 
Letter Agreement under the Statute of Frauds apply to this theory. However, for the same 
reasons that Coulter's actions are insufficient to show partial performance, they are also 
insufficient to support a theory of promissory estoppel. See Knight v. Seattle First Nat'l 
Bank, 22 Wash. App. 493, 589 P.2d 1279,1282 (1979) (explaining that the part performance 
by offeree sufficient to preclude withdrawal of an unilateral offer must be clearly referable 
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to the offer, definite and substantial, and beneficial to the offeror and further that 
,f[b]eginning preparations though they may be essential to carrying out the contract or 
accepting the offer, is not enough."). 
Even if the Court were to determine that Coulter's part performance raised an issue 
of material fact regarding whether Russell was estopped from withdrawing his offer, the 
Court should still affirm the district court's summary judgment because Russell's withdrawal 
could equally be considered a rescission of any enforceable contract. Although ignored in 
its appellate brief, Coulter took great care to emphasize in its opposition papers that the 
parties understood that Coulter would complete development of the subdivision "forthwith" 
and with "due diligence." E.g., R. 227, Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
Coulter has also submitted affidavit testimony explaining that the parties intended and 
believed the lots would be developed and ready to purchase by Spring 1992. R. 219, 
Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 12; R. 346, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan Coulter II 14. 
Notwithstanding Coulter's "substantial efforts" to develop the Property (which included no 
physical work on the Property and no necessary, preliminary administrative work to allow 
for subdivision plat approval) nothing had happened by Spring 1992-which was the time the 
parties intended for all conditions to have been met and Russell paid. Assuming the Letter 
Agreement was enforceable, Russell was justified and entitled to rescind it by virtue of 
Coulter's failure to perform forthwith. See generally 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 583 
(1991) ("It has been said, moreover, that in a transaction in which prompt action was 
evidently contemplated by both parties, mutual delinquency gives rise to the presumption 
of mutual assent to a rescission."); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 584 (1991) ("[T]here is 
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authority that a great delay in performance may be regarded as a ground for rescission even 
though time is not of the essence and no notice to perform has been given."). In addition, 
the fact that Coulter agreed to relinquish its rights under the Letter Agreement by agreeing 
to trade the Coulter Property for the Russell Property shows that Coulter acknowledged and 
accepted the fact that Russell withdrew his offer and rescinded any enforceable contract. 
See R. 15-51, Real Property Exchange Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should ensure that Russell suffers no further prejudice or delay through 
the cloud that Coulter has inequitably demanded remain on Russell's property through this 
lawsuit and appeal. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact necessary for this 
Court to determine that the Letter Agreement is void and cannot be specifically enforced 
by Coulter. Accordingly, Russell respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district 
court's summary judgment in its favor. 
DATED this )Z> day of February 1996. 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH & DUNN 
iael N. Zundel, Esq. 
N. Brems, Esq. 
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Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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